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~TATE~IE~T

OF NATURE OF CASE

Thi~ i~

an action ehallenging as unauthorized in law
and wi thont foundation in fad the order of Spencer C.
Taylor, Bank Conunissioner for the State of Utah, which
granted First St>enrity State Bank (hereinafter referred
to a~ First 8Pen ri ty) a charter to establish a branch bank
in the Cottonwood :Jfall in Salt Lake County, Utah.
DISPOSITIO~

IX LOvVER

COl~RT

The case was tried to the court, which held that the
defendant Bank C01nmissioner abused his administraSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tive discretion and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
awarding the defendant First Security the Certificate of
authorization to operate a branch. The Certificate was
therefore rescinded, vacated and set aside, and the defendant First Security was enjoined from establishing
or conducting a branch bank in the Cottonwood Mall, Salt
Lake County, Utah, pursuant to the said Certificate.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-appellant seeks reversal of the judgment
of the trial court rescinding and vacating the Bank Commissioner's action, and issuing an injunction against
First Security from establishing a branch bank pursuant
thereto. Plaintiff-respondent seeks affirmance of the
judgment, and to broaden the grounds upon which such
judgment rests by construction of the applicable branch
banking statute via declaratory judgment that the establishment of the First Security Branch at the location
conte1nplated within the Cottonwood Mall would be "such
close proximity'' as to constitute "unreasonable interference" as a matter of law.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The trial court found that the Bank Commissioner
abused his ad1ninistrative discretion in that he failed to
take account of or ignored the recently enacted (1953)
unique brrmch banking statute which is applicable only
to the unincorporated areas of SaU J.~akr County, and
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failed to tnake the factual determinations conte1nplated
thereunder. The statute provides:
"No branch shall be established at a location
outside of the corporate limits of a city or town
in such close proximity to an established bank or
branch as to unreasonably interfere with the lntsiness thereof."
(~<·etion

7-3-6 F.C.A. 1953, as amended. Emphasis

added.)
A<'eordingly, one issue properly before this Court
1~

whether sufficient evidence exists in the record to
support the lower court's finding.
A broader question of law is also presented by the
record, i.e., whether under the facts of this case-which
i~ a near ultimate case in terms of "close proximity"
of two banks-there is "unreasonable interference" as a
matter of law by virtue of unimpeachable facts which
establish the sole statutory standard of "close proximity."

An additional issue before this court as to which
the trial court failed to make a finding is whether the
Bank Conunissioner abused his discretion in "finding"
the existence of "public convenience and advantage,"
which is another statutory condition precedent to action
by the Bank Commissioner.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Staten1ent of Facts in appellants' brief is deficient in that it fails to set forth vital findings and eviSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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dence, primarily as relates to the concept of "close proximity" and its effect upon previously established bank
business. In particular, the paraphrasing of Bank Commissioner Taylor's testimony tends to deemphasize the
obvious inattention given by the said Conunissioner
either to the statute itself or to any aspect of the business of the Zions' branch as such might be affected by
the granting of the First Security charter. Also, the
findings and evidence which affirmatively show "unreasonable interference" by reason of "such close proximity" are neglected. Accordingly, this supplementary
recitation of facts is meant to set forth more fully the
material facts which are felt to be determinative of the
legal issues involved.

Location : Close ProximityThe lower Court found:
"7. The Cottonwood Mall, sometimes referred to as the Cottonwood Shopping Center, is lo-.
cated in an unincorporated area of Salt Lake
County, Utah. (R. 87, Emphasis added.)
"8. The proposed new brane.h of defendant
First Security State Bank will be located substantially adjacent to the present branch bank of
plaintiff, Zions First A' ational Bank, the branches being located on opposite sides of the covered
Mall and separated by 182 feet across the width
of the covered ~{all. (R. 87, En1phasis added.)

* * *
"10. Placement of the proposed branch
bank of defendant First Securitv State Bank at
the contemplated location within· the Cottonwood
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Mall constitutes close pro.rimity." (R. 88, Emphasis added.)
The factual support for these findings is unquestionable.
Both defendants admitted in the pleadings that the two
hratH'h hank~ would be "im1nediately adjacent" to each
other. (R.5 and H. 10), and the Bank Exmniner charaetPrized tlw locations as "contiguous." (R. 30) The
findings an• likPwisP ~upported h!· Exhibit P--1: (R. -1:3,
+1), whieh is an archih•ct'~ plat ~upported by affidavit
whi(·h shows that the branches would be located in the
srune portion of the Cottonwood 1\lall Building, covered
by the smne roof and separated only by 18:2 feet across
tlw width of the :Mall itself.
X o i 11 rest ignt ion of effect of "close proximity," "unr('a . . .·oJwlde i nte rfe renee·'' or "business (of) established
bank"

ThP lower court found:
••9. It affirmatively appears that no determination was 1nade by defendant Spencer C.
rraylor, Bank Commissioner of the State of Utah,
as to zchcthcr placement of the proposed First
S('curity State Bank branch within the Cotton·zcood "'11 all zcou l d constit1tte close proximity to
the existing Zions Cottonwood branch so as to unreasonably interfere with the business thereof."
(R. 88, Emphasis added.)

• • •
"11. The ['close proximity' statute] ... was
ignored, and it affirm at i z:ely appears that the
facts "-ith respect to whether the proposed branch
bank would unreasonably interfere with the existSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ing branch bank were not sufficiently inquired into by the defendant Spencer C. Taylor, Bank
Commissioner of the State of Utah, prior to October 16, 1962, the date of execution of the Certificate authorizing the conducting of a branch bank
by defendant First Security State Bank in the
Cottonwood Mall . . . " (R. 88, Emphasis added.)

* * *
"12. On or before October 16, 1962, the defendant Spencer C. Taylor, Bank Commissioner
of the State of Utah, did not know and it affirmatively appears that he had not made sufficient inquiry to form a judgment as to what effect iu
terms of unreasonable interference granting tlw
application for placement of the proposed new
branch bank of defendant First .Security State
Bank within the Cottonwood Mall would have upon the business of the pre-existing branch bank
of plaintiff located within the Cottonwood Mall
by reason of close proximity thereto." (R. 88,
Emphasis added.)

• • •
"13. It affirmatively appears that no i11quiry or invec'-digatiun was madr by defendant
Spencer C. Taylor, Bank Connnissioner of the
State of Utah, nor the State Banking Department
before granting the Certificate on October 16,
1962, as to the effect which granting the First
Security State Bank application would have upon
the business of the pre-existing Zions Cottonwood
Branch Bank by reason of proximity thereto." (R.
88, Emphasis added.)

Chief Bank Examiner Quinn conducted an investigation for the Banking Department (R. 28-38) and inquired
jnto various matters and areas of in1portanee whieh were
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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rPgardPd hy Bank Conunissioner Taylor as adequate and
calling for all "essential infol'lnation" (Dep. 6). HowPVPI', the invP~tigation failed to call for a finding or information relative to the unique law applicable to unincorporatl'd area.s of Salt Lake County, i.e., the effect
(po~~ible llllrl'a.souablf' interference) upon the business
of an ,.,..,.faf,fislll'd bank by reason of the "close pro.rimity"
of a proposf'd branch bank.
The Bank Cmnmissioner neither made nor caused
to be mad<> any ~tudy or investigation rPlativ<> to the
matter of tlw possible <'ffect which "close proximity"
might have upon the business of the Zions Cottonwood
Branch. Actually, it seems clear that any ideas the Commissioner had as to "close proximity" were very general
and not based 'Upon facts applicable to the specific situation, or for that matter upon facts of essential consideration under the statute applicable to the unincorporated
areas of Salt Lake County:

"Q.

And you considered close proximity in the
Cottonwood Mall area in the same sense that
you would consider it in Salt Lake City
proper1

A.

Yes, or Logan or Brigham or Cedar City.

Q.

Or any other area¥

A.

Yes.

(Dep. 62.

Emphasis added.)

Q. . . . Have you ever had any occasion to make
any studies of the effect that proximity has
to the business of a pre-existing branch bank,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that is proximity of another competing
branch bank~
A.

I have made some observations. Down in
California they put a branch on one corner
and following a few days (doors~) from there
there would be a branch on the other corner,
just cater-cornered. And I don't know what
the reasoning is but banks seem to want to
compete with each other right on the ground.

Q.

Have you made any studies in Utah on this
matter~

A.

Just as I have stated, that wherever there are
banks that they are generally-where there
is more than one bank they are generally in
pretty close proximity." (Dep. 63. Emphasis
added.)

Commissioner Taylor testified that for purposes of
his decision he made no special finding as to the matter
of close proximity (Dep. 67), although by the time of his
deposition he did regard the placement of the two banks
in the proposed location within the same building as
"close proximity" (Dep. 67). Actually, the Cmn1nissioner
had the rather startling notion that banks in "close proxiinity" would actually benefit each other, which was certainly not based upon an)~ investigation of banks, but
rather appeared to be based upon hearsay as to certain
other businesses :

"Q.

Is it your state1nent that You believe that
placing a competing branch. bank right next
to a pre-existing branch bank could help the
first bank~
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:\.

\Yell it creates 1nore business.

(~.

For what braneh?

A.

Both banks.

Q.

ll ow does placing First Security right next
to Zions bring In ore business to Zions~

.\.

\Vell it brings 1nore business to the area.

Q.

But doel:l it bring 1nore business to

A.

1 think so.

Q.

Have you ever 1nade any studies to show that
placing a branch right next to another one
actually helps the first branch~

A.

I have read a lot on the subject and this is
true lcith grocery stores and gasoline stations
and :·.:lwe stores.

Zions~

~[r.

Nebeker: Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
.. BY 1\IR. GREENE:
Q.

Do you think that placing First Security
State Bank where it is intended to be placed
would help the business of Zions~

A.

I think it would create a healthy situation.

Q.

But would it increase the business volume of
Zions~

~\.

I donJt know. That is a loaded question; I
don't know.

Q. \Vell do you have any reason to think that it
would actually increase the business volume
of Zions?
A. -v;ro, I zcouldn't have any."
(Dep. 63, 64. Emphasis added.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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As to the matter of possible unreasonable interference or adverse effect 1tpon the business of the Zions'
Cottonwood Branch bank, Commissioner Taylor failed to
inquire into any aspect of the business of the Zions
branch. This in spite of the fact that the unusual quality,
design and size of "Salt Lake area's finest suburban
bank" (R. 26) was emphasized to the Bank Commissioner, and he recognized the "lush" nature of the Zions'
branch and that such "was in keeping with the rather
nice decor and nature of the decorating in the Mall itself."
(Dep. 33) (See representative pictures-Exhibit P-5.):

"Q.

Now did you make any studies with regard
to the expenses of Zions First National Bank
Cottonwood branch~

A.

No. I had no occasion to do that.

Q.

Did you consider the cost of its leasehold!

A.

I had no occasion to do that.

Q.

The matter of its square

A.

No.

Q.

Or the kinds and types of business equipment
that it had~

A.

No.

Q.

The cost and the number of employees and
personnel employed to operate that branch?

A.

No.

Q.

'The expenses per month~

A.

Of

footage~

Zions~

Q. Yes.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A.

No."

(Dep. 43)
~\.lthough

tlw C01nn1issioner testified that the ''breakl'l'l'n'' J)()int was and is an essential consideration in
analysing profitable branch banking (R. -!3), he made no
inquiry into t hP factors which would establish the breakPYPn point of tlw Zions-Cottonwood branch (Dep. 43, 44).
The Bank ( om missioner had no knowledge of th<> critical
matter of Zions' Cottonwood Branch deposit '0·ol1une at
any ti1ne during the pertinent period of time before the
Fir~t SPeurity application was granted (Dep. 56, 57),
and he made no c01nputations as to Zions' deposit volume
or as to thP total potPntial deposit volume for all banks
and financial institutions in the so-called "bank service
area." (Dep. 81) It had been called to his attention, and
Conuni~~ionPr Taylor was well aware, that the Zions
Branch was so located and planned as to have foregone
tlw free ~tanding, drive-in type bank business (Dep. 33)
and that its success depended upon attraction of the business accouJits primar·ily u·ithin the Mall itself (R. 26).
Also, the Conunissioner knew that First Security emphasized as a condition to its anticipated success in the area,
the acquisition of "business accounts primarily from the
shopping center itself . . . " (R. 20). Notwithstanding
these facb, Commissioner Taylor failed to make or cause
to be made a study or survey as to the effect which placing another institution within the Mall would have upon
the potential attraction of business accounts away from
Zions' previously established business.
1
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As a n1atter of fact, the only evidence Commissioner
Taylor had before him as to the effect granting this application would have upon Zions was that it would be
detrimental to Zions. The allegation in plaintiff's Complaint, that Zions had presented evidence to the Bank
Commissioner that the plaintiff "is losing money as a
result of the operation of its branch in the 'Cottonwood
Mall' and that the addition of another branch in the area
would have an adverse financial effect upon the business
of the Cottonwood Branch of the plaintiff," was admitted
(R. 5, 10). Officials of Zions, both by letter and conference, emphasized to the Commissioner that the branch
would need at least a three-year period of time after the
shopping center opened to "become self-sustaining" (R.
26) and to get "on its feet" (Dep. 34). (Zions' formal
opening was June 4, 1962 (Dep. 32); about half the stores
were open in the Mall by the time Commissioner Taylor
granted the First Security charter (R. 24) ; the formal
opening of the Mall was in Spring 1963.)
Overbanking: No nred for additional banking facilities-

The lower court found:
"5. C. B. Quinn, Chief Exa~niner for the
Utah State Banking Department, undertook an
official examination of the facts and circumstances relative to the application of First Security State Bank for a branch in the Cottonwood
Mall and prepared a written report to defendant
Spencer C. Taylor, Bank Commissioner of the
State of Utah, relative thereto. The said report
was filed with defendant Spencer C. Taylor~ Bank
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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{ ~onunissimwr of the State of Utah, in the spring
of 1~Hi~, and concluded that granting the application of defendant First SPeurity Bank would creatP an O/'('r-/)({nked co11ditio11 and that no need exists for additio1utl banking facilities in flu' area
in quP~tion." (R. 87, E1nphasis added.)
rrhe Quinn l'Pport (H. 28-38) inquired into and establi~hP<l faet~ a~ to tlw statutory require1uent of "public
eonYenience and advantage," ,,·hieh is applicable to all
areas of the ~tatP where branch banking is pennitted,
including tlw unincorporated areas of Salt Lake County.
'flw eondusions of this report, based upon the factual
~tndy eontained therein, were adverse to "public convenience and advantage":
"It is this exmniner's opinion that the granting of applicant's proposed branch will create an
ovcrba nk('d condition."
(Itelnl4(a), R-35. Emphasis added.)

* * *
"It is this examiner's opinion that no need
c.rists for additional banking facilities in this area.
In the very core of the primary area involved there
are three operating banking facilities and one savings and loan outlet. On the fringe of this area
there are two operating banking facilities (one of
~Chich ,is operated by the applicant) and one which
has been approved but not yet established."
(Item 1-1-(b), R-35. Emphasis added.)

* * *
"Applicant's (First Security's) projected estiDlate of potential deposit volume may be o ce rly
optimistic zclzen compared to the experience of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the established banks in the general service area."
(I tern 16, R-35. Emphasis added..)

* * *
"A protest against the granting of this branch
was entered with this department on November 28,
1961 by the Zions First National Bank. No other
formal protests have been filed with this department against the establishment of the proposed
branch. However, the officers and managers of
the financial firms that are represented in this
area were of the opinion that the area is being
well serviced with present facilities and the granting of an additional _facility would not be ethical
or proper."
(Item 26, R-38. Emphasis added.)
The Quinn report was filed with Commissioner Taylor
in the Spring of 1962, perhaps as late as June (Dep. 11).
At the time it was filed Commissioner Taylor agreed with
all aspects of the report, including the conclusions and
comments stated above (Dep. 59, 69, 75). On or about
October 16, 1962, Commissioner Taylor told :Jfr. Quinn
that he was "going to decide against him," but ~fr. Quinn
never advised .JI r. Taylor that he had changed his mind
as to the report or the 1natters contained therein (Dep.
7'7, 78). However, on October 16, 1962, in conference
with Governor Clyde, Commissioner Taylor's mind was
changed, and the applieation of First Security was granted (R. 28). Cmnmissioner Taylor had before hin1 no additional studies or reports upon which to base a decision in
effeet overruljng his own Banking Department.
Probably the 1nost erucial single faetor '''ith regard
to "public convenienee and advantage,'' whieh in Yo lye~
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thP ttnestion of .. nPPd'' for other banks and "overbanking," i~ the 1natter of ratio of banking institutions per
('a pita of population within the primary or "bank service"
an·a. ~\~ to this 1natter Cmn1nissioner Taylor discarded
the only evidence before him, which was supplied by
First SPeurity. That evidence was that one branch bank
pPr 10,750 population within the ''primary bank service
area" is "generally standard" (R. 19). Cmnmissioner
Taylor said that his standard was one branch per 8,000
to 10,000 people:
"Q.

I am trying to get what your standard would
be in determining whether or not an area is
overbanked in terms of population.

A. I say eight to ten tl101tsand people."
(Dep. 52. E1nphasis added.)
As to the nu1nber of units per population within the ''bank
servicl' area," which area was defined both in the First
~t•curity application (R. 19) and the Quinn report (R. 34)
as tltt• area between 3900 and 7800 South Streets and betwPPn 900 East and the "\Vasatch l\Iountain Range, Mr.
Taylor agreed that the seven branches listed by Examiner
Quinn (R. 30) would compete within the "bank service
arPa," which contains a population of approximately
43,000 people ( R. 19 ; R. 34; Dep. 46). He further agreed
that bank:5 on the fringe of the area obtain the "bulk of
their potential deposit volume . . . from the primary
area in question." (Dep. 74)
The net result as to the population factor is that
Comn1issioner Taylor recognized that at least eight inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
stitutions within the bank service area "would directly
compete with each other." These are:
Zions First National Bank, Cottonwood Mall
Branch
Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co., Holladay Branch
Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co., County Office
Valley State Bank, Cottonwood Branch
Valley State Bank, 56th South Branch
Valley State Bank, Olympus Branch
First ~Security Bank of Utah, N.A., Highland
Drive Branch
First Security State Bank, Cottonwood Mall
Branch
Simple mathematics shows that 8 into 43,000 is one
branch per every 5,375 people, well below the Bank
Commissioner's own standard, and about one half the
standard as advocated by First Security. This excludes
the banks on the fringe of the area which the Commissioner recognized would also compete. It should be carefully
noted that this analysis is very conservative, and does not
take account of the effect of a pending branch application of lVfurray State Bank at 7335 South Ninth East
(east side of street) (Dep. 49), the Beehive State Bank
branch application at 9400 South Seventh East (Quinn
Report R. 37), the Western Savings an~ Loan Office
within the Cottonwood !1all (Quinn Report, R. 30) or the
Olympus Hills Branch of First Security State Bank
which is just outside the area in question but which Mr.
Quinn fmmd to be servicing the area in qu.estion (Quinn
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
Report, lten1 2ti, H. 38). It should be noted that the contPm plated branch of .Murray State Bank was to be lo<·nted within Uw prhne ~PrvieP area some three 1nilP~
do~Pr than thP pPnding Beehive State branch application
which .1/r. (Juiun had predicted would overlap the trade
a n·<t ( lten1 :2:~, R. :ri). Al~o, it is pertinent here to oh~Prve
that siucc fl1e hcarill!J an additi(nwl branch bank charter
//((,..,. heen fJI"<tllfed in the same area, namely, a charter to
\r alkPr Bank & Trust Con1pany "'in the inunediate
vit·inity of 3900 South and Highland Drin~" which further
~atnrah'8 the "bank service area" and dilutes the gross
available to each competing institution in such a manner
as to accentuate the problem of "overbanking" already
found to exist in the area. If all of the banking institutions enumerated were to be considered in assessing the
nutth•r of bank-population ratio as bearing upon "public
<'OllYPniPnee and advantage," we would have at least
hn'lvP institutions, whieh, 'Ylwn divided into 43,000, gives
the ridiculous and obviously unworkable ratio of one bank
per 3,583 people!
Ha11k Conuni::;sioller's "Investigation" as to "growth
of the JlaW': inadequate and based upon incompetent
''data''-

The lower court found:

"1!./. No substantial evidence and no substantial competent evidence was before the defendant
Spencer C. Taylor, Bank Commissioner of the
State of Utah, from any source upon which to
base a determination that the proposed establishnlent of the First Security State Bank branch in
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the contemffia~d location within ~he. Cottonwood
Mall wouldA'1fe in such close proxrm1ty as to unreasonably interfere with the business of the preexisting Zions Cottonwood Branch Bank." (Emphasis added.)
The deposition of Comrnissioner Taylor clearly demonstrates that he based "his" decision to grant First
Security's application upon a nonstatutory test, i.e., the
purported "growth of the Mall" (Dep. 30, 36, 55, 75, 78),
though the supposed growth as disclosed by the deposition was nothing more than guesswork. This was also
the basis for a purported "determination" that the business of Zions' Cottonwood branch would not be unreasonably interferred with. Commissioner Taylor testified:

"Q.

Well now in determining that placing First
Security there wouldn't unreasonably interfere with Zions, I believe you said the primary consideration was the growth of the Mall,
is that right~

A.

Right.

Q.

Now were there other cousiderations in making that determination that there wouldn't
be unreasonable interference~

A.

Oh none except that I have every confidence
in Zions First National Bank."
(Dep. 80. Emphasis added.)

As to the alleged "gro-v{th of the Mall," the Commissioner relied aln1ost exclusively upon his own personal
observations. The naturP of these observations was
casual- ''just a matter of walking around the }\[all and
watching the progress" (Dep. 19). J\fr. Taylor felt that
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t lw Mall .. was a trPmPndous thing" ... +J)ep. 25), but there
was no atteinph•d ~eientific analysis or factual determina-

tion:
"l 1nade no study. The extent of my study,
as I told yon, was visiting the Mall and watching
the growth out there."
(Dep. 58)

rrlw first "observation" of Cmn1nissioner Taylor was
with n•gard to supposedly large nu1nbers of people using
tlw ~(all. Hmn•ver, ~lr. Taylor's "infonnation" was
hasPd upon sunnise and speculation and even events sub:·:eqn('llf to the granting of First Security's application:

"A.

Yes. I was out there I guess before Christmas
and we jttst couldn't find a parking place
tl1 ere, as 1nany parking places as they have.

Q.

That was before Christmas 1962?

_.A.

Yes.

Q. "\Yas there a ti1ne before October 16th, 1962,
that you couldn't find a parking place?
A.

X o, I don't believe so.

Q.

TT' ell the crozcds of people that you are particularly talking about would be the Christmas shoppers then, is that right?

Yes."
(Dep. 23. Emphasis added.)

A.

As to the potential number of bank customers in the
pertinent areas, Cmn1nissioner Taylor never became
aware and IWYer n1ade or caused to be made any survey
as to the number of people using the Mall (Dep. 24), and
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he had no knowledge a~ to what areas the people using
the I\iall came frmn (:Dep. :2-1, 25). Notwithstanding the
lack of factual data, Mr. Taylor 1nade some personal
guesses, such as the state1nent that the ~Jall would ·• ...
draw probably beyond the areas that either bank would
draw frmn ... " (Dep. -14) and that a store within the
Mall, such as ZCMI, "draws frmn all oYer tlw State"
(Dep. -±4), but he 1nade no study to determine what pull,
if any, applicable to banking there might be from areas
beyond the "bank trading area" described in the Quinn
report (Dep. 57, 58). Further,.Comn1issioner Taylor said
that he did not consider the population (Dep. 57) or the
effect of other existing branch banks within the larger
"shopping center trading area", although he stated that
that would have been proper had the larger area been
considered (Dep. 58).
The next "observation" made by Commissioner Taylor was as to the businesses within the Mall. It had been
estin1ated by First Security in its application (R. 20, 21)
and in the Quinn Report (R. 33) that some 50 businesses
would be established within the ~fall in the course of its
completion. Mr. Ta~-lor observed some of these previously contemplated businesses open for business to the
public, and by the time he granted First Security's application he estin1ated that about half of the forecasted
businesses had opened (Dep. 2±). However, as to any
specific analysis of the matter, it was apparent that the
whole rationalization was largely an afterthought, and
specifjr data relative thereto had been compiled only
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tillw u.l'tPr ( )dolH'l' l(i, 19(j2, nlr. Taylor obtained a list
ot' bu~inP~~P~ which had as pn·dicted opened for business
within the nlall (Dep. :23, 2-!):
"(~.

How 1nany of the some predicted 50 husiestablish1nents would you say had been
opened by the tilne October 16th, 19():2, rolled
around?
.\. I wouldn't tell yon witho1tt rejerri11g to tl1e
d u tes there.
The dates y01t have refcrcuce to would be on
the 1ist that U'as supplied to ill r. Nebeker?
A. Yes.
(~. \Vell would you say based upon your recollection that half of themA. I would think so, yes."
( Dep. :2:3, 2-1-. Emphasis added. See also Taylor
Dep. 1-l:-18, \Vhich was stricken by agreement
since it related to matters obtained subsequent to
the granting of the application.)
;\dually, ~I r. rra~·lor could point out no business establishment within the nfall which opened before the First
~Pcurity application was granted (Oct. 16, 1962) which
wa~ not anticipated or known at the time of First Security'~ application in November of 1961 or at the time
the Quinn report "·as subn1itted to Com1nissioner Taylor
in about April of 1962.
nP~~

The personal contacts made by Commissioner Taylor
were equally casual. First, and foremost, ~Ir. Taylor
stated that he relied upon information supplied by Wayne
F. Richards, the manager of the Mall. Virtually all of
that inforn1ation, which was vague in any event, was
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supplied to Commissioner Taylor after he granted the
application, so it was stricken by agreen1ent from the
record. (See Taylor Dep., page 14, line 18 through page
18, line 28.) Next, Mr. Taylor referred to a brief and very
casual conversation with Sid Horman, the builder of the
Mall. The conversation, in 1lr. Taylor's words, was not
"pertinent" (Dep. 19), had nothing to do with the banking business (Dep. 22), and consisted primarily in congratulations for the marvelous job done at the Mall
(Dep. 22). Mr. Taylor also talked with Scharf Sumner
on a casual occasion at the opening within the :Jfall of
Western Savings and Loan (Dep.19).
In his deposition, Commissioner Taylor stressed the
'"growth" of the Mall, but the record fails to show
"growth" in the sense of the addition of things new or in
the sense of enlarging the basic physical plant. The Cottonwood Mall Building itself was fundamentally completed at the time Mr. Quinn made his report, and the
largest store-ZCMI-had opened some time prior to
the Quinn examination. However, Mr. Taylor testified
that certain elusive "changes" came about from the period of the receipt by hin1self of the Quinn report (Spring
1962-perhaps as late as June (R. 11)) to the date he
granted the application of First Security (October 16,
1962 (R. 39) ). Upon analysis, these "rhanges" weren't
reall~' an~·thing new:
"Q.

With regard to the 1\Iall itself, did you consider that something had changed between
the time that Mr. Quinn filed his report with
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you and the tilne that you granted the application t
A.

YP8. I think the growth of the Mall and the
type of businesses they got out there were
quite a factor.

Q.

But hadn't ~lr. Quinn taken that into consideration, the probability that these things
would be opened as outlined in the First Se('Urity State Bank application 1

Well the statement, where he concluded, I
think probably he might have done."
(Dep. '76)

A.

"Q.

You say the population had changed in the
six-month period 1

A.

Yes, the population had grown too.

Q.

How much had the population grown-

A.

I couldn't answer that.

Q. -from the spring of 1962 to the fall of 19621

A. I couldn't answer that but it is growing at a
rapid rate.
Q.

Did you have any figures to make you think
that-

A. I didn't take this into consideration. I told
you the primary deciding factor with me was
the growth of the Mall itself."
(Dep. 78)
It is a~~Prted by counsel for appellants that Zions
Bank had "every opportunity" to put evidence, facts and
argument h~~fore the Commissioner (Appellants' Brief,
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pp. 23, :2-1), and that the approach the Bank COimnissioner took was to follov{ "the rnethods of the businessnlan" (Appellants' Brief, pp. 2.6, 27). It is true that
Zions had presented facts to the Commissioner concerning probable darnage and injury to its business as well
as other facts bearing upon the statutory conditions of
"public convenience and advantage" and "close proximity." (As a matter of fact, the evidence presented by
Zions was the only evidence fr01n any source which the
Commissioner had before him as to "unreasonable interference" due to "close proximity.") With regard to the
alleged "growth of the Mall," Zions presented no evidence or information because it was totally unaware that
the matter had become an issue in the Bank Commissioner's mind. There was no changed condition or growth
beyond what had been planned and fully anticipated. (As
a matter of fact, the only change ·was the substantial
delay which came about in accomplishing what had been
planned.) It was known that salient facts respecting the
M_:all and the area were before the Commissioner and that
the Chief Bank Exan1iner had made an official investigation respecting these n1atters. There was no additional
evidence to be presented as to these matters!
As to the "businessrnan's" approach, Zions Bank had
fully assurned that businesslike data and factual information ·would be ernpJo~~ed in rendering the decision. Instead, the decision ·was based upon speculations of 2\Ir.
Taylor as to the "growth of the Mall," without benefit
of any factual study or survey, without any Bank Examinr>r'~ investigation of such alleged "growth'' and 1rithout
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nnlit't' or t'i'<'ll the sllf/.f/1'.';/inJI tu /:ioJ/s Bank that the

:-;uppt•:-;t·d growth "·a:-; being eon~idt·rPd. In this <·omw<·t i1111, it should IH' dearly noh·d that there was 1w hearing
u~ to ~I r. Taylor':-; "ill\'P:-;tigation~·· and tlH·n· was 110 illritatiou hy Counui~~ionPr Taylor to rPpresentativ<·~ of
Zions Bank in order for thmn to prP~Pnt their views and
t•Yidt'll<'t' on the subjeet of th<' alleged "growth of the
~lall" (Ta:dor Dep. 36) .

.Al{U Ul\lENT
POINT I.
THE ACTION OF THE STATE BANK COMMISSIONER
OF UTAH IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF FIRST
SECURITY STATE BANK FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A
BRANCH WITHIN THE COTTONWOOD MALL, SALT LAKE
COUNTY, UTAH, WAS VOID IN THAT THERE WAS UNREASON ABLE INTERFERENCE BY REASON OF CLOSE
PROXIMITY AS A MATTER OF LAW.

Tlw 1~).);) mnend1nent to the Utah branch banking
8tatntf\ whirh i~ applicable o11ly to the unincorporated
areas of Salt Lake County, provides:
"~Xo branch slwll be established at a location
outside the corporate li1nits of a cit:v or town
in Sitch close pro.1·i mity to an establislz rd l)(wk
nr branch as to 1n1reasonably interfrre 1cith the
lws in rss t hr reof."

(F.C.4-\. 1953 1-3-6,

a~

mnended. Emphasis added.)

It is submitted that a declaratory judgment should
he rendered interpreting this statute, which has never
been construed, to forbid rirtually ad.facrnt and contiguOits branch banki11g in Salt Lake Cnwlfy.
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The sole statutory standard with reference to the
existence of "unreasonable interference" with the business of an "established bank or branch" is u such clos:e
proximity." Under our statute, "close proximity" is
equated with "interference". The statute forbids "unreasonable interference," which is to be ascertained
solely by "such close proximity." Accordingly, the legislature contemplated that there would be situations where
a proposed branch bank location relative to a preestablished bank or branch location would itself be unreasonable. Since the effect of contemplated locations
would obviously vary depending upon distance or "proximity" from the pre-established banks or branches, the
statute contemplates a factual determination by the
Bank Commissioner as to which locations would be so
close as to be unreasonable, except that some locations
would be so close as to be unreasonable as a matter of
law. Such "bedrock" locations would be those placed
adjacent, contiguous, and virtually munder the same
roof" with pre-established banks or branches. Such locations go beyond mere "close proximity" and become
u such" close proximity within the statutory prohibition.
Hence, it might be said that adjacent or contigious
branch banks in the unincorporated areas of Salt Lake
County constitute unreasonable interference per se. If
the statute isn't violated in such situations it could never
be violated!

In any event, it is submitted that under the facts
of this case there is "unreasonable interference" by reason of "such close proximity" as a matter of law. The
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fad~

hPrein prP~Pnt a "bedrock" or near ulti1uate situation in tPrlll~ of <'l<>~<'nP~~ of branch bank locations. Additionally, t hP n·eord affi rmat i rely shows that injection
of tlw nPw branch bank within the Cottonwood ~lall in
"Hueh <'I<>~~' proximity'' would "unreasonably interfpn•"
with the .. established" Zions branch bank. (As to this
matter, among other things, Chief Bank Examiner Quinn
had officially reported the existence of "overbanking" in
the area and "no need" for furth8r banking facilities
( R. 35). Another branch charter in the same area could
only aggravate the situation to the detriment of the preestablished branch bank.)
The arguments herein submitted are made without
benefit of precedent. Not only is the statute under consideration uniquely and solely applicable to the unincorporated areas of Salt Lake County, but it appears to be
a uniquely worded type of branch bank prohibition, no
preeise statutory or case precedents being existent from
otlwr jurisdictions to the "Titer's knowledge. It will be
helpful, therefore, to consider the general historical development of our branch banking statutes in order to
ascertain the legislatiYe intent and public policy con~idPration~ applicable thereto.
~\s a preli1ninary n1atter, it should be recognized that
banking is a necessarily regulated industry, being "afferh'd with the public interest.'' (7 A1n. Jur., Banks and
Banking, ~ertion 9 at p. 30; 9 C.J.S., Banks and Banking,
~Pdion -1:2 at p. 80. See also Italy c. John so 11, 200 Cal.
1. :2;) 1 Par. 7S-1 (Calif. 19:2/).) In this connection, this
l'ou rt ha~ rerognized the publir's concern in branch bankSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing and the necessity for restrictions. (Union Trust Co.
v. Simmons) 116 Utah 422, 211 P.2d 196 (1949)) (Petitioner conceded in this case the right of the legislature
to prohibit branch banking in Utah.)
Until 1933 branch banking was absolutely prohibited
in Utah, as it still is prohibited in a majority of states.
(7 Am. Jur., Banks and Banking, Section 23; 9 C.J.S.,
Banks and Banking, Section 55) Since 1933, Utah has
permitted branch banking in certain areas and under
certain conditions. Caution in the expansion of branch
banking in this state is apparent from analysis of stringent conditions which our legislature has imposed, which
conditions fundamentally express the public policies of
protection of the general public, as well as protection of
the pre-established banks. Recognition of the evils of
"overbanking" is apparent by the imposition of the said
eonditions. In this connection, the requirement of promoting the "public convenience and advantage" (protection of the general public) was enacted in the original
statute (Laws of Utah 1933, Chapter 6) and has been
carried forth as a condition relative to all areas wherein
branch banking is permitted. (P.C.A. 1953 7-3-6, as
amended ..) Also, the requiren1ent that a branch "take
over an existing bank" (protection of pre-established
banks) was in the original statute, and is still mandatory
in some areas where branching is permitted (U.G.A. 1953
7-3-6, as amended). Accordingly, in 1951 when dealing
with a city or town other than a city of the first class,
the legislature maintained that absolute prohibition under certain conditions, as to the entire city or town.
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( Ln\\·~

or

t'tah 1!l.->1, ClutptPr 10) That i~. in:-;tPad of thP

.. ,·ln~t· pro:xilllit<' t<·~t. thP entirP corporate limits of an
org·anizPd muni<·ipal <·orporation wa~ wwd a:-; tht> boundar~. ThP eondition::-; madP applieahlP wpn• that if an e~
lahlishnl IHIIIk II'Us O)J<'I'a!illf), no nPw branch could lw
t·~tahli~hPd un\p:-;:-; tlw bank ~Peking to <-'stablish the
brnneh touk urer II/(' Uj)('J'(tfillq bank. Then, to further
rl'~t riet tlw ~pn·<Hl of branch banking, it was provided
that a unit bank in ~lH'h eity or town could not be taken
oYPr as a branch until it had lwPn in operation as a unit
hank for a period of fire year •..,·. This law is still applicahl<-'. ( l ·.(
1!).);3 7-:;-li, a~ mnended.)
\YIH•n th<> legislatnn>, h:· mnendrnent in 1953, came
to dPal for th(' fir.-,·t time \\·ith th<· establishe1nent of a
branch in an lf.JiiJI(·orJJorated area, it had to find appropriatP JangllH,!..!,'I'. (:~ ote; the (JII[Jf unincorporated area
whPrPin branch banking i~ permitted at all is Salt ·Lake
County, sincP ~alt Lake i::-; the only county which contains a cit:· of tlw first class as required by the statute.
A~ to unincorporated areas of other countiP~, the pre] !l:~:~ policy of absolute prohibition still applies.) The
lPgislatnre eould not ·well say, as it had done "·ith respect
to a city or town, that only one branch bank could be established in the entire unincorporated area of a county.
It ,,·as IWe<-'ssa ry that it look to the realities and impose
such restrirti on~ as were reasonably comparable to those
applicable in the case of cities and towns. Hence, "close
prn:\imit:·" was used as the area concept instead of the
t•nti n· town or eit:·. and the formula of "unreasonable intt•rt't•rt·lH'P .. with ''establi~lwd bank ... business" as occa~in1wd hy "such closr }Jrruimify" \Yaf' used to enhody
1

• .\.
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the concept already applicable to incorporated areas,
nan1ely, protection of existing banking institutions and
the general public from overbanking and unwarranted
competition within the same basic area.
Based upon the plain wording of the statute, as well
as apparent legislative intent from analysis of the branch
banking statutes, it is submitted that the "close proxirnity" statute should be construed as a matter of law
to prohibit extremely close, "side by side" type banking
locations, and in any event the contemplated location of
First Security should be so construed in this case.
POINT II.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL
COURT'S FINDINGS THAT THE DEFENDANT BANK
COMMISSIONER ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN IGNORING
THE "CLOSE PROXIMITY" STATUTE AND IN FAILING TO
MAKE 'THE FACTUAL DE'TERMINATIONS CONTEMPLATED BY THE SAID STATUTE.

The trial court held that the action of the Bank Commissioner in granting a branch bank charter to First
Security was null and void in that it ·was without foundation in fact, thus constituting an abuse of administrative
discretion. The holding is based upon the finding that
the "close proximity" statute was not inquired into, and
determinations conternplated thereunder were not made.
This assumes, notwithstanding the admitted existence
of "such close proximity," that there were still factual
determinations to be made by the Bank Commissioner
relative to the effect of "such close proximity," i.e.,
whether such would constitute -"unreasonable interference" with the business of the "established bank or
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branch." rrhis

WHS

thP theory Of the statute adopted by

t ht> trial eourt, which is vigorously defended herein!

The "elosP proximity" statute constitutes a limitat·ion or resfrict·iou upon the Bank Connnissioner in that
it spts forth a mandatory coudition or standard that must
hP followed. The recitation of facts as set forth herein
denwnstratPs that th(' Bank Commissioner failed to comply with tlw said statutory condition precedent. Actually. tlw facts show that notwithstanding the existence of
"<'lose proxilnit~·" in this situation, the Bank Commis~ioner failed to inquire into the effect which the said
"<'lm;p proximity" would have upon the established business of Zions, no investigation having been 1nade in
order to ascertain tlw existence or non-existence of "unreasonable interference."
\Vith regard to the applicable law, it will be well
first to comment with reference to the authorities contained in Appellants' Brief. Generally speaking, there
i~ no quarrel with the authorities contained therein. There
appears to be an attempt, however, in the use of certain
authorities, to suggest a near absolute and unrestricted
admini~trative discretion in banking matters. That is
ePrtainly not tlw law applicable in this jurisdiction in
riell' of our ('.!pre ..,·~ ~tatutory coJlditions and prohibitions.
HenrP, the quotation from Professor Davis and the authorities construing the federal banking statute are in no
wi:-;p appropriate with reference to Utah law. The reason for this is that the federal law contains almost no
rt-'strirtions as to the actions of the Comptroller of the
Currency, in sharp contrast with the Utah statute as to
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the actions of the Bank Commissioner. Thus, in Community National Bank of Pontiac v. Gidney as Comptroller of the Currency, 192 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Michigan 1961), it was noted as to federal banking that there
was a Congressional intent "to place in the hands of the
Comptroller almost complete control over many aspects
of banking." (192 F. Supp. at 517) In this connection, the
court commented upon ". . . the failure of Congress to
provide any standards by which this court could determine whether the exercise of discretion by the Comptroller was 'reasonable' or whether it was 'arbitrary' ... "
(192 F. Supp. at 519)
It is submitted that the action of the Bank Commissioner with reference to the matter of granting or denying branch bank charters in unincorporated areas of Salt
Lake County (as well as the other areas of the state) is
limited by standards and must be based upon substantial
competent evidence. In this connection, the Bank Commissioner's action could not be based upon nonstatutory
tests or upon personal "investigations" not factual in
nature. The applicable principles of law are as follows:
1. Limited Discretion of the Bank CommissionerConditions Precedent.
While it is proper to speak of an abuse of discretion as the standard in judging the propriety of the
decision of the Bank Commissioner, it is not proper
to consider that discretion in terms of an unlimited
discretion. It is submitted that certain statutory
standards have been given which must be followed by
the Bank Com1nissioner and which must guide a reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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viewing t'OUrt in dt>t'iding the qw·:.;tion whetlu•r or not
his dP<·i:.;ion wa:.;, in l';wt, arbitrary or capricious. This
is ulwrn book" law applicable to ad1ninistrative de<'i:.;ion:.; in general:
"~irwv

such action is not in accordance with

law, is in PXePss of authority, and presents a judi-

C'ial qnesfio11 or a que::;lion of lau· fur the coHrt, a
eourt on revil·\\· of action of an administrative

agen<'y, under express provisions of smne statutes
but even i11 the ab::;cnce of statutes providing for
.i udicialreview or relief and in the face of statutes
purporting to preclude judicial review, this being
a nmttPr of constitutional right in son1e instances,
will pass on, and in a proper case grant relief
from or set aside, agency action, findings, and conclusions which are arbitrary, capricious, or both
or either, lfll1'casrmalJlr, or arlJifnt1·y or unreasona/Jle. O'r an abuse of power or discrrtion."
504, ;)0;). (Emphasis added.)
This Court has often taken note of these principles
of administratin• law, representative statements of
tlw doctrine appearing in t\YO cases involving review
of derisions of the Departnwnt of Business Regulation:
"If thPy should fail to regularly pursue their
authority. or refuse to do so, or act in any manner
which is arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory
as to the applicant, recourse to the courts is available."

Clayton z:. Bennett, 5 Utah 2d 152, 298 P.2d 531
(1956)
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"Should the department, or its exanunm~
committee, fail to so properly discharge its duties
or act in any manner that is capricious or arbi
trary, the applicant would not be at the mercy oJ
said department of such committee, but recours~
to the courts would be available."
Alexander v. Bennett, 5 Utah 2d 163, 298 P.2c
823 (1956)
It is well recognized law that where statutor)
standards are given, state banking department offi.
cials may not exercise an unlimited or absolute discretion. Statutory standards and conditions must be
complied with, and such compliance is a condition
precedent to valid administrative action. The Utah
statute provides two fundmnental standards, both of
which must be inquired into by the Bank 'Commissioner in justification of any purported decision
granting an application for branch banking in unincorporated areas of Salt Lake County. The first is
the matter of "public convenience and advantage"
and the second is the matter of "close proximity""unreasonable interference" (U. C.A. 1953 7-3-6, as
amended). In other areas of the state, additional or
other standards are applicable. Hence it was recognized in the Utah case of Union Trust Company v.
Simmons, 116 Utah 422, 211 P.2d 196 (1949), that
"petitioner has not complied with any of the requirements for the establishment of a branch bank under
this method." (The method referred to was the law
applicable to Ogden, Utah, wherein it was necessary
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to takt> ovPr an Pxi~ting unit bank in order to establish
u hranch tlwrPin.)
In Jl'all r. Fenn('r, 7t> So. Dak. 252, 7G N.\V. 2d
7~~ (H. Dak. 1956) nmnda1nus to review denial of
application for a bank charter was rejected and the
Bank Com1nission's discretion was upheld. However,
tlw <·ourt emphasized the responsibility in terms of
standards of the Commission:

''When the Commission acts on an application
it must, in carrying out this legislative mandate,
determine questions of fact. In making such determination the Commission of necessity exercises
a discretion. However, this statute does not give
the Connnissio11 an ttnlimited or absolute discretion. Its actions must be based on determinations
of facts ... It requires the 'Commission to inquire
into specifird factual areas thus limiting the ComIll ission' s concern to the areas enumerated." 76
N.,V. :2d at 724. (Emphasis added.)
Arrord, Speer 1'. Dossy, 177 Ken. 761, 198 ·S.W. 19·,
~() (Ky. 1917) wherein the court pointed out that the
han king ad!ninistrators' " ... discretion must be exer<'i~Pd only within the limits prescribed by the statute."

Tlw ea~P of Daughin Deposit Trust Co. v. Myers,
:~ss PPnn. -+++. 130 A. 2d 686 (Penn. 1957) involved
a proceeding for approval of articles of merger of
two hanks, which had been denied by the Department
of Banking. The order of the Department of Banking
disapproving the said articles of merger was reversed
since the Department had based its decision upon a
nonsta.tutnry test. The statutory standard was
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whether the 1nerger was made for a "legitimate pur.
pose," but the Banking Department had disapprovec
the 1nerger on the ground that there was "no need".
In Moran v. Nelson, 322 Mich. 230, 33 N.W. 2d
772 (:Mich. 1948), a suit was commenced to vacate
and set aside an order by the State Banking DepartInent and for permission to organize a new bank.
The court upheld the applicants and directed the Bank
Commissioner to grant their petition, holding that
the Bank Commissioner had erroneously refused to
grant the charter because of a mistake in the interpretation of the statutory 1neaning of the term
"necessity." The court said:
"In the light of the foregoing we are constrained to hold that the plaintiffs did establish
'necessity' for another barik in Detroit and that
as a matter of law defendant erred in his concept
of the scope and meaning of necessity as used
in the particular statute, which error primarily
resulted in denial of plaintiff's petition."
33 N.W. 2d at 779
('The later Michigan case of Bank of Dearbourne v.
Taylor, 365 Mich. 567, 114 N.W. 2d 210 (Mich. 19·62)
involves a different result, but the same principles,
in that the court emphasized the matter of the existence of a special law and of the standards set forth
in particular laws. This is one of the cases wherein
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thr I ~ank ( 'ollHHisHimwr·~ di~<·rPtion was upheld, but
~w·h di~eretion observed that it
ahl<· to do ~o only sincP thPn: \Vas an absence of
a statutory provision prohibiting cmnpetitive banking.
Had thP L'tah statntP been in effect it is sub1nitted
that a different result would have followed.)

tlw <'ollrt in upholding
wa~

2.

~uh~tantial

Competent Evidence Rule.

Lt is submitted that there is no substantial evidenre upon which the alleged finding of noninterfer<'tH'P as occasioned by close proximity could be based
fr·om this record. Certainly the self-serving and legally ohj~:etionable portions of First Security's application (H. 1-1:-:2-t) do not constitute competent evidence
upon which alo11e the decision could have been based.
A<"eordingly, a Motion to Strike the legally insuffi('ient portions thereof was filed. In any event, it is
patPntly apparent that the First Security application
wholly fails to i11quire i11to the crucial matter of the

c.ffcct of close pro.rim-ity upon the b1tsiness of ZionsCottonwood branch. The application doesn't even
purport to set forth any facts ·with respect to these
matters. _-\..~ to tlw Bank Com1nissioner's "investigations'' and n:-:P of alleged "Inethods of the businessman" (_AppPllants' Brief, pp. 23, 2-!), it is submitted
that ~ueh does not qualify as competent evidence. As
a matter of fact, the alleged "businessman" type
methods in fact were speculations as to possible
"growth of the ~Iall'' without benefit of factual data
or snrYPY of any kind. In any eYent, it is clear that
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the Bank Commissioner n1ade no inquiry as to the
effect such close proximity would have upon the business of Zions. Actually, the only evidence before the
Connnissioner as to this matter was that the business
of the Zions branch would be unreasonably interferred
with, which would support a ruling directly opposite
to that rendered by the Commissioner.
In any event, the rule is well established that
there rnust be substantial competent evidence in the
record on which to base such an administrative decision. It is submitted that there was and is no such
evidence in this case. It is recognized in administrative law that the administrator is not bound by the
ordinary rules of evidence. But nevertheless, there
is still applicable to his actions the "legal residium
rule," i.e., that his decision must rest upon substantial
evidence. Where is such evidence in this case~
This Court has been consistently insistent upon
such requirement. In Union Pacific Railroad Co. v.
Public Service Com'n., 5 Utah 2d 230, 300 P.2d 600
· (1956), the court said :
"·The legislature has clothed the Commission
with plenary power to determine public convenience and necessity and to decide what common
carrier shall render service. 'The findings and conclusions of the Commission on questions of fact
are subject to review by this court only to determine if they find substantial support in the record."
The substantial evidence in question must also be
legally competent :
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" ·[ t i~ not required that the facts found by
t hP 'Commission be conclusively established, nor
even that they be shown by a preponderance of the
PvidPIH'P. lf then· is in the record competent evidt>nrP frmn which a reasonable mind could believe
or conclude that a certain fact existed, a finding
of such facts find~ justification in the evidence,
and we cannot disturb it.' "

Cintah Freight Lines v. Public Service Commis:;iun, 119 Utah 491, 229 P.2d 675 (1951),
ttuoting Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission, 101 Utah 2-!5, 117 P.2d 298 (1941).

l.n the case of ill oormeister v. Golding, 84 Utah
:t~-1-. :27 P.2d +!7 (Utah 1933) this Court was considering a proceeding for the revocation of a physician's
license. The Doctors' Board didn't have presented to
it competent evidence upon which to base its recommendation relative to the physician in question. The
court held that the physician's Board had no jurisdiction to enter its order since it wasn't based upon competent n:idence (:27 P.2d at -152). Further, this Court
ha~ held that an adininistrator cannot proceed to
render a deci:;iuu ignoring competent evidence which
would be ind icat ire of a different result (which is the
situation which we submit exists in this case), Jones
v. California Packing, 121 Ftah 612, 244 P.2d 640
(rtah 19;):2). (Held, the Industrial Commission can-

not disregard con1petent evidence and render a contrary decision notwithstanding the existence of smne.)
The F nited States Supreme Court has defined
evidence" to be:

"~nb~tantial
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" ... evidence which is substantial, that is,
affording a substantial basis of fact from which
the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. (authorities cited) Substantial evidence is more than
a scintilla, and must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established.
'It 1neans such relevant evidence as a reasonable
1nind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,' (authorities cited) and it must be enough
to justify, if the trial ·were to a jury, a refusal
to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to
be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury."
(Emphasis added.)
National Labor Rel. Bd. v. Columbian E. & B. Co.,
306 U.S. 292, 59 S. Ct. 501, 83 L. Ed. 660
(1939).
(Banking cases accord: In re Commercial State Bank
of Scottsbluff, 105 Neb. 248, 179 N.W. 1021 (Neb.
1920); Application of Millbnrn - Short Hills Bank,
59 N.J. Super. 470, 158 A.2d 66 (Superior Court N.J.
1959); Farb v. State Banking Board, ______ Tex.------, 343
S.W. 2d 508 ('Tex.1961))
It is submitted that upon analysis as to the "evidence" before Commissioner Taylor relative to the
matters of close proximity and unreasonable interference with the business of Zions ·Cottonwood branch,
such was neither substantial nor competent. ·The alleged determination was without foundation in fact!

3. Personal Investigations by the Bank Commissioner.
It is very clear that Commissioner Taylor actually based the decision which he rendered upon his
own personal observations, which, to say the least,
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non~eit>ntifie

and certainly speculative. There
wa~ no invitation to representatives of Zions to pre~Pnt to the ( ~onunissioner evidence and facts as to
the allPgPd "growth of the Mall." So, certainly, there
wa:-; no opportunity for the exchange of information
or eonfrontation of thP supposed "facts" in the Cmnmi~~ionpr':-; po~~Pssion (Dep. 36).

Wl'rt'

The law in thi:-; umtter appears to be clear:

"Even though an administrative authority
has statutory power to make independent investigation~, it is improper for it to base a decision or
findings upon facts so obtained, unless such evideneP is introduced at a hearing or otherwise
hro1tght to the kuowledge of the interested parties
prior to derisiou, witlz an opportunity to explain
and rehllt."
Anno. Ad1ninistrative Law-Evidence, 18 A.L.R.
:2d 552, 562. (Emphasis added.)
Further, the authors of American Law Reports have
statNl:
"\Yhile it is ou1·io1tsly improper for an admini,-.·tratiL·e tribunal to make a view of premises
or physical inspectiou of a person without giving
notice to tlzc interested parties, the courts are
not in agree1nent as to whether the facts observed
by the trier of facts at such an occasion may con8titute a proper basis for the decision without
bei nq made a part of the record and ~resented
to the parties.

··on flzc one hand, it has been held that the
knozdedge qaiued by an administrative authority
.from a rie1r of premises cannot be made the basis
nf drrision, unle ..;:s the perti·nP'nf facts are made
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part of the record and brought to the attention
of the parties."
Anno. Administrative Law-Evidence, 18 A.1L.R.
2d 571-572 (Emphasis added.)
. (A split of authorities is noted as to this matter, but
it is submitted that the better view is as quoted and
indicated.)
The principle in law that is particularly stressed
is that the administrative decision must be based upon
known evidence and not secret evidence. Hence, the
authors of American Jurisprudence have stated:
"The principle that administrative adjudications must be made upon known evidence applies
to any kind of information obtained by the administrative agency secretly and at a time or
place other than that appointed for the hearing,
including ex parte testimony and affidavits, evidence taken prior to the time the one against
whom the decision runs was made party to the
proceeding, and individual's own record, undisclosed statements or views of subordinates within
the agency, the report of a hearing officer to the
agency, and the report or recommendations of advisors to the determining agency."
2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law,§ 384 at page
191 (Emphasis added.)
A case that is very pertinent with regard to this
matter is the banking case of Elizabeth Federal Savings & Loan v. Howell, 24 N.J. 488, 132 A.2d 779 (N.
J. 1957). In that case the court held that where the
determination of the banking commissioner obviously
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rested in part upon infonnation of which the objecting
bank had no notice or access, the proceeding should
ht· remanded tu thl' uank comm,issioner for further
findings and detennination based upon facts. The
court in~isted upon a cmnpletion of the record so that
further findings and a substantial basis could exist
n·lativl' to the detennination of the bank cornmissionPI'. The court then pointed out:
.. Nevertheless, without recogn1z1ng them as
'parties' he ( Con1missioner) afforded the objectants an opportunity to present whatever evidence
and argument they had in opposition to the application of Colonial. These proceedings, however,
could by no n1eans be characterized as a full hearing in the true sense of that word. While the objecta nts u:ere given every opportunity to present
thrir own evidence, they were in substantial respects denied the opportunity to meet the evidence
on the other side of the case and that relied upon
by the Commissioner. Some of the evidence was
furnished Px parte by Colonial to the Commissioner and not made available to the objectants."
1~~~ .A.2d at 782 (Emphasis added.)
ln the ea~P at bar, Zions was never given an opportunity to meet the very "evidence" upon which
Commi~~ioner Taylor relied in 1naking his decision,
i.P., alleged .. growth of the :Jfall." Certainly evidence
could han• been presented by Zions to the Commissioner as to deposit volume, population, available
busine~~ accounts and other data applicable and peculiar to the banking problem at hand as related (or
more properly not related) to the alleged "growth of
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the :Mall." No evidence of any kind was before the
Commissioner as to the relationship, if any, between
the apparent growth of the Mall and the probability
of noninterference occasioned by close proximity.
This type of evidence could and should have been
solicited by the Commissioner.
It is submitted that the basis for the alleged
"findings" of the Bank Commissioner-his own secret
personal observations-was and is insufficient in
law. It could in no wise be considered as competent
evidence, and since it was essentially secret and nondisclosed, it was improperly considered in any event.
POINT' III.
THE PRESUMED "FINDING" BY THE BANK COMMISSIONER OF THE EXISTENCE OF "PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND ADV AN'TAGE" WAS WITHOUT FOUNDATION
IN FACT AND CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF ADMINISTRATIVE DI8CRETION.

The applicable statute imposes the additional statutory requirement that adequate inquiry be made into the
matter of "public convenience and advantage." The statute provides :
"No bank shall be permitted to establish any
branch or office until it shall first have been
shown to the satisfaction of the bank commissioner and the governor that the public convenience
and advantage will be subserved and promoted
by the establishment of such branch or office and
the bank commissioner may by order permitting
the establishment of such branch or office desig~
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nate and limit the character of work and service
whieh may therein be performed."
(HPetion 7-:~-f), U.C.A. 1953. Emphasis added.)
ThP lower <·ourt found that the Chief Bank Exmniner
<'lt>nrly d.Ph•rmined on the lntHiH of a factual study the
lack of need for ((II ({(/ditional/)((JtkillfJ institution in the
arfa, and the fact of ot'l'rhallkillff in the area. However,
thP lowPr eourt preferred to base its decision upon the
:-;olP ground of abuse of administrative discretion relative
to thP ''eloHP proximit~·'' statute and requirements thereunder. It is equally true, however, that while the Bank
I lt>partment didn't ignore the matter of "public convenit'll<'P and advantage,'' the facts which were before the
Bank ·Commissioner did not justify his decision of the
PxistPtH'P of ''publie convenience and advantage" and
t lw decision was without foundation in fact. Certainly,
the written report of the Chief Bank Examiner failed to
justify sneh a decision. There was no additional study
or report before the Bank Commissioner upon which to
ha:-;p a dPrision in effect overruling his own Banking
Department.
·The ~nnw principles of law as ~Pt forh under Point II
above a~ relating to applicable standards regarding abuse
of dj~erPtion and the necessity of administrative determination:' lwing founded in substantial competent evidence are applicable hereto.
"~ith regard ~pecifirally to the Inatter of the <>vii

of "overbanking", which our legislature surely meant to
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ience and advantage," the following authorities are sub.
mitted:
In Delaware County National Bank v. Campbell, 378
Pa. 311, 106A.2d 416, 423 (Penn. 1954) the Pennsyl.
vania court said :
"The legislature ... did not exclude or intend
to exclude competition between banks; it intended,
inter alia, to exclude such competition as would
likely weaken or destroy some banks in an over
banked community and thus weaken or injure the
entire banking system to the detriment of deposit.
ors, creditors, stockholders and the public alike."
(Emphasis added.)
In line with this judicial pronouncement is the economic and social viewpoint, summarized thusly:
"In the field of banking ... it is firmly established that the benefits of unrestricted competition are not worth the inevitable price ... "
H arfield, Legal Restraints on Expanded Banking
Facilities, Competition and the Public Interest, 14 Business Lawyer 10116 (1959)
The relationship between proper competition and
the public interest is astutely crystalized in an article
appearing in the Banking Law Journal which thoroughly analyses the purport of the factor of "public convenience and advantage":
"Healthy competition is desirable, but competion in an over-banked area is disastrous. The
standard will be interpreted so as to further the
prime public interest in having a sound banking
system. It may be that a monopoly will be the
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incidt.•ntal result of the furtherance of the superior
social inll'rl'sf.'' (Empasis added.)
Stokes, Puhlit Colll'l'nience and Advantage iu
Applitalions for 1\~('U' Banks and Branches,
7-t. Banking Law Journal 921, 929 (1957)

CONCLUSION
It i~ rt-~}H'<'tl'nlly sub1nitted that the action of the
Bank Commissioner in granting First Security's
application is void as a 1natter of law. The Utah Legislature recognized that at some point the factor of close
proximity would result in unreasonable interference.
CPrtainly, that point is reached in contiguous or adjacent
hranch banking. Our "close proximity" statute should be
~o construed. In any event, in the face of the "bedrock"
and virtually ultimate situation of "close proximity"
under the fact~ of this case, the existeence of "unreasonahlP interference" by reason of "such close proximity"
lweanw a matter of law, and the application of First
~~·~·urity should be rejected by virtue of the clear existf•ncr of the sole statutory standard of "s1tch close prox~tntP

imity.''
In any t'H'nt it is subn1itted that the judg1nent of the
trial court should be affirmed in that there is substantial
evidPnce to support the findings that the action of the
Statt· Bank Comn1issioner constituted an abuse of adminin~trative discretion, such being \Yithout foundation in
fact. In this connection, the record is clear that the statulor.'! requirement of measuring the effect of close proximity upon the business· of the prr-establisJzed branclz
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bank was totally and wholly ignored! The Commissioner's
alleged ''determination" as to this matter is not supported by substantial evidence and in fact is not supported by
any information of any kind. This is true in that it affirmatively appears that no inquiry was made or attempted by the Bank Commissioner into this matter, and the
only evidence bearing upon the Inatter was presented by
rPpresentatives of Zions and was to the effect that the
proposed new branch bank would unreasonably interfere.

Substantial competent evidence supporting the alleged "determination" by the Bank Commissioner that
the proposed new branch would satisfy "public convenience and advantage" is lacking. The facts contained in
the report of Chief Bank Examiner Quinn, which Commissioner Taylor accepted as facts, demonstrate that because of the population, deposit volume and other factors
bearing upon "overbanking" in the area, there was not
only a lack of public need, but the presence of probable
detriment both to the public in general and to the banking
institutions in the area in particular!

Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff-respondent respectfully seeks affirmance of the judgment of the trial
court rescinding and vacating the Bank Commissioner's
action and issuing an injunction against First Security
from establishing a branch bank pursuant thereto. Plaintiff-respondent also respectfully seeks affirmance of the
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c·ation of the First ~(·<·nrity branch bank would violate
the l'close proximity" ~tatntP as a matter of law.
H<'~fH•ett'nlly

submitted,

MARR, WILKINS & CANNON

J. Thomas Greene
Paul B. Cannon

Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
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